Tim Harford makes the case that simplistic applications of game theory to the ongoing Israel-Hezbollah conflict don’t capture the realities of the situation. A popular understanding of game theory, and the prisoner’s dilemma in particular, holds that a “tit for tat” strategy — where you initially cooperate with the other party, until they defect and attack you, at which point you punish them until they start cooperating again — is oftentimes the most succesful approach to a conflict. This is mostly based on the computerized tournaments that Robert Axelrod ran between different strategies, where Tit For Tat came out victorious. But Harford points out that for a variety of reasons real world conflicts don’t typically fit the repeated prisoner’s dilemma model.

But “tit for tat” is just a little too much of a poster child. The repeated prisoner’s dilemma is a poor description of real-world situations. It didn’t describe the Cold War, when a nuclear exchange was a one-off game if ever there was one. It doesn’t describe the asymmetric struggle between Israel on one hand and multiple decision makers—Lebanon? Hezbollah?—on the other.

Most important, the “prisoner’s dilemma” is merely a two-player game. Game theorists such as Ken Binmore, a professor at University College London, say this is a crucial omission. Most social arrangements stand or fail with the help of third parties. The crisis in Lebanon will be no exception.

In any case, “tit for tat” is not quite as successful as conventional wisdom would have you believe. A team from Southampton University kicked “tit for tat” off the top spot in a rerun of Axelrod’s tournament by entering a collection of team players who colluded with each other. Another successful strategy is “tat for tit,” which first tries to exploit the other person and plays nicely only if that doesn’t work. Another winning approach is even more depressing, punishing cheats with eternal vengeance.

Read more: Hezbollah and the Prisoner’s Dilemma